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We use the entanglement sampling techniques developed by Dupuis, Fawzi and Wehner [1] to find a lower
bound on the entanglement needed by a coalition of cheaters attacking the quantum position verification protocol
using the four BB84 states [2, 3] (QPVBB84) in the scenario where the cheaters have no access to a quantum
channel but share a (possibly mixed) entangled state Φ˜. For a protocol using n qubits, a necessary condition for
cheating is that the max- relative entropy of entanglement Emax(Φ˜) ≥ n−O(logn). This improves previously
known best lower bound by a factor∼ 4, and it is essentially tight, since it is vulnerable to a teleportation based
attack using n−O(1) ebits of entanglement.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Mn, 89.70.Cf
The very first (classical) position verification (PV) protocols
have been distance bounding protocols, introduced in 1993
[4] to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. Based on the speed-
limit c on information propagation imposed by special rela-
tivity, they can only work when the prover P and the verifier
V are close, and are useless against nearby malicious adver-
saries M, i.e. when distance(M,V) ≤ distance(P,V) [5].
PV protocols by a coalition of distant verifiers {Vi} are there-
fore needed in such situation, as they allow to build localized
authentication protocol, but also many other cryptographic ap-
plications, like key distribution at a specific place [6]. How-
ever, Chandran et al. have shown in 2009 [6] that no classical
PV protocol can be computationally secure against a coalition
{Mi} of malicious provers. They only found a protocol secure
in the bounded retrieval model.
Quantum position verification (QPV) protocols appeared the
next year in the scientific literature, with publications of three
independent teams [2, 3, 7–10]. Even in the quantum case,
unconditional security is unattainable [3], and a universal at-
tack using an exponential amount of entanglement as been
found by Beigi and König [11]. To guarantee the security of a
QPV protocol one either need a computational hypothesis [12]
or a bound on the quantum entanglement shared between the
cheaters [3, 11, 13, 14].
The present work is in the latter framework, where the
cheating coalition {Mi} only has access to a limited amount of
entanglement. Despite the exponential universal attack [11],
all lower bounds found so far have been linear [11, 14] or sub-
linear [3, 13]. To our knowledge, the protocol showing the
best security in this framework is the protocol using mutually
unbiased bases QPVMUBs proposed by Beigi and König in [11].
A n-qubits implementation of QPVMUBs is secure against ad-
versary holding less that n/2 ebits. However, QPVMUBs needs
the coherent manipulation of n qubits and is therefore impos-
sible to implement with present day technologies.
QPVBB84, introduced in [2, 3] and defined below, is ex-
perimentally much simpler since it essentially uses quantum
key distribution components [15, 16], and Tomamichel et al.
[14] have proved its security against adversary holding less
than − log2(cos2(pi/8)) · n ' 0.22845 · n ebits of entangle-
ment. We improve this bound to n − O(log n) ebits. Since
a teleportation-based explicit attack using n − O(1) ebits is
known [8, 13], this bound is tight.
We start this letter by giving some useful properties of the
min-entropy Hmin and the max- relative entropy of entan-
glement Emax, a related entanglement monotone. Since our
security proof is based on an adaptation of the entanglement
sampling based security proof [1] of weak string erasure (WSE)
in the noisy storage model (NSM), we then describe this pro-
tocol. We then show its security the noisy entanglement model
(NEM) and use it to show the security of QPVBB84.
In the following S(A) is the set of quantum states of the
system A.
Definition 1 (min-entropy). Let % ∈ S(AB) be a bipartite
state. The conditional min-entropy Hmin(A|B)% is
Hmin(A|B)% := − inf
τ∈S(B)
inf
{
λ ∈ R : % ≤ 2λIA ⊗ τ
}
The following property shows the conditional min-entropy
of a classical-quantum (cq) state is essentially the logarithm
of the probability to guess the classical part from the quantum
part.
Property 2. [17, theorem 1] Let % ∈ S(XB) be a cq-state,
i.e. a state of the form % =
∑
x px |x〉 〈x| ⊗ τx with τx ∈
S(B)∀x. Then,
Hmin(X|B)% = − log2 pguess(X|B)%,
where pguess(X|B)%) is the maximal probability of guessing
the value of X from an optimal measurement on B.
The max- relative entropy of entanglement has been intro-
duced by Datta [18] as an entanglement monotone closely re-
lated to Hmin.
Definition 3 (max- relative entropy of entanglement). Let
% ∈ S(AB) be a bipartite state. Its max- relative entropy
of entanglement is noted Emax(%)A;B or Emax(A;B)% and is
Emax(A;B)% := inf
σ∈D
inf
{
λ ∈ R : % ≤ 2λσ}
where D is the set of separable states of S(AB).
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2Property 4 (monotony of Emax). [18, theorem 1] The max-
relative entropy of entanglement Emax is an entanglement
monotone, i.e. it can only decrease under local operations and
classical communications (LOCC). More formally, let Λ be
completely positive trace preserving (CPTP) map S(AB) →
S(A′B′) which can be achieved through LOCCs.
Emax(%)A;B ≥ Emax(Λ(%))A′;B′
In order to establish the theorem 6 linking Emax and Hmin,
we will need the following lemma :
Lemma 5. Let D(A:B) ⊂ S(A,B) be the set of separable
states, i.e. the convex hull of the set of product states S(A)⊗
S(B). For any state σ ∈ D(A:B), there exists a state τ ∈
S(B) such that σ ≤ I⊗ τ .
Proof. Let σ ∈ D(A;B), there exists a mixture {pi, τ iA⊗τ iB}i
of states of S(A)⊗ S(B) such that
σ =
∑
i
piτ
i
A ⊗ τ iB since σ ∈ D(A:B)
≤
∑
i
piIA ⊗ τ iB since ∀i, τ iA ≤ IA
= IA ⊗
∑
i
piτ
i
B = IA ⊗ τ defining τ :=
∑
i
piτ
i
B
Theorem 6. For any bipartite state % ∈ S(AB),
Emax(A;B)% ≥ −Hmin(A|B)%
Proof. For any separable state σ ∈ D(A : B), there exists a
state τ ∈ S(B) such that
% ≤ 2Emax(A;B)%σ (from definition 3)
≤ 2Emax(A;B)%IA ⊗ τ (lemma 5)
The definition of −Hmin as lower bound (definition 1) then
implies Hmin(A|B)% ≤ −Emax(A;B)%.
Now that we have the relevant properties of Hmin and
Emax, we study the weak string erasure (WSE) protocol. It
was introduced, together with the noisy storage model (NSM)
by König et al. [19] to build secure bipartite protocols. The
NSM is based on a technological limit imposed on quantum
memories : after a delay ∆t, the quantum state they can hold
decoheres and becomes noisy. In this model, a protocol is
split in two phases. A bipartite protocol involving the tradi-
tionally named Alice (A) and Bob (B) can therefore be seen
as a quadripartite protocol between two coalitions : it first in-
volves early-Alice (A1) and early-Bob (B1), and then, after
∆t, later-Alice (A2) and later-Bob (B2). A noisy quantum
memory held by Bob is then modeled by a noisy quantum
channel F : B1 → B2.
The WSE protocol proposed in [19] can be described as fol-
lows, for honest Alice(s) and Bob(s):
1. A1 choses uniformly at random Xn = {xi}i and Θn =
{ϑi}i, two bit strings of length n.
2. B1 choses uniformly at random Θ˜n = {ϑ˜i}i, a bit string
of length n.
3. A1 sends to B1 the quantum state
⊗
i Hˆ
ϑi |xi〉, where
Hˆ is the Hadamard operator and {|0〉 , |1〉} the compu-
tational basis of a qubit. It is the BB84 encoding of the
string Xn in the basis Θn.
4. B1 measures the qubits in the bases Θ˜n, and gets the
string X˜n.
5. Both parties wait the time ∆t. The classical memo-
ries of Alice and Bob corresponds to classical channels
allowing A1 to send {Xn,Θn} to A2 and B1 to send
{X˜n, Θ˜n} to B2.
6. A2 sends Θn to B2.
7. B2 computes I = {i : ϑi = ϑ˜i} and X˜I = XI
We are interested here by the correctness of the protocol,
but only by its security against a dishonest Bob.
Definition 7. A WSE protocol is λ-secure against Bob if the
probability for B2 to correctly guess the string Xn is smaller
than 2−nλ. More formally, let C(A2,B2) be the set of all pos-
sible states σA2,B2 which can be obtained at the end of the
protocol if Alice follows it but Bob is dishonest. The protocol
is secure for Alice if, ∀σ ∈ C(A2,B2),
1
nHmin(X
n|B2)σ ≥ λ.
Instead of the λ-security, which ensures exponential secu-
rity with n as long as λ > 0, one can also be interested in the
ε-security for a fixed n :
Definition 8. A protocol is ε-secure iff, for any possible dis-
honest strategy, the probability pcheat for a dishonest adver-
sary to win is pcheat < ε.
Lemma 9. For a protocol like WSE or QPVBB84, where the goal
of the cheater is to guess a classical stringXn, λ-security and
ε-security are equivalent notions when
ε = 2−nλ ⇔ λ = − 1n log2 ε
Proof. This follows directly from the definitions and property
2.
In the NSM model, a dishonest Bob changes the above pro-
tocol in the following way:
4. B1 performs a generalized measurement on the qubits,
obtaining a joint cq-system CQ1.
5. During the ∆t wait, B1 stores this state in his mem-
ory. While the classical memory is perfect, the quan-
tum memory is described by the noisy channel F, and
B2 obtains CQ2 = (I⊗ F)(CQ1).
37. At the final step, the global quantum state is σ ∈
S(XnΘnCQ2), where A2 holds the classical informa-
tion Xn and B2 has access to the classical information
ΘnC, as well as to the quantum information Q2. B2
tries to guess Xn from ΘnCQ2 and the security of the
protocol is measured by Hmin(Xn|ΘnCQ2)σ .
Theorem 10. ([1, theorem 14]) Let Bob storage device F have
a maximal fidelity, as defined in [1], upper bounded by η. The
WSE protocol defined above is λ-secure for
λ ≤ 12
[
γ
(−1− 1n log2 η)− 1n] ,
where γ is the function defined by
γ(hmin) :=
{
hmin if hmin ≥ 12
g−1(hmin) if hmin < 12 ,
g(α) := h(α)+α−1; h(α) := −α log2 α−(1−α) log2(1−
α) is the binary entropy function.
We defer the reader to [1] for the proof of this theorem. We
will now reformulate it in a slightly different security model,
the noisy entanglement model (NEM).
In the NEM, A1, A2, B1 and B2 are actually four differ-
ent persons, localized at different places and connected with
(unlimited) classical channels A1 → A2 and B1 → B2. The
protocol WSE is the same as described above, except that there
is no specific ∆t at the step 5. B1 andB2 also share a (possibly
mixed) entangled state Φ˜Q1,Q2 instead of a quantum channel
F. The two models are obviously related, since one can cre-
ate a state Φ˜ by transmitting it through F, and one can create
a channel F through teleportation, using Φ˜ and the unlimited
classical channel.
We now adapt theorem 10 to NEM, exactly following
Dupuis et al.’s proof [1] until their corollary 11 and slightly
changing it after. As usual, we study the equivalent entan-
gled protocol, where A1 prepares a maximally entangled state
|Φ+〉⊗nAA′ , sends the A′n half to B1 and gives the An half to
A2. A2 finds the string Xn by measuring An in the basis Θn.
Lemma 11. [1, corollary 11] With the notations above, and
γ defined in theorem 10, we have
Hmin(X
n|ΘnCQ2)σ ≥ 12
[
nγ
(
1
nHmin(A
n|CQ2)σ
)− 1]
We can now show the security of WSE in NEM :
Theorem 12. Let the dishonest Bobs share a (possibly mixed)
entangled state Φ˜ ∈ S(B1, B2). In the NEM, the WSE protocol
defined above is λ-secure if
λ ≤ 12
[
γ
(
− 1nEmax(Φ˜)
)
− 1n
]
Proof. We will look at the entanglement between B2 and the
other partners A1A2B1. The only entanglement which exists
at the beginning of the protocol comes from Φ˜. Then all the
operations specified by the protocol, as well as the ones al-
lowed in the NEM, are LOCCs according to the A1A2B1 : B2
split. We have therefore
−Emax(Φ˜) ≤ −Emax(σ)An;CQ2 (property 4)
≤ Hmin(An|CQ2)σ (theorem 6),
where σ denotes the state shared by A2 and B2 just before
their measurements.
Applying the monotonously increasing function γ leads us
to
γ
(
− 1nEmax(Φ˜)
)
≤ γ( 1nHmin(An|CQ2)σ)
Lemma 11 then gives
≤ 2nHmin(Xn|ΘnCQ2) + 1n ,
which with some reordering and the definition 7 of λ con-
cludes the proof.
Corollary 13. Let ε > 0. WSE is ε-secure in the NEM if
Emax(Φ˜) ≤ n− s− nh
(
s
n
)
where s := 1− 2 log2 ε and e is the basis of the natural loga-
rithm. A slightly more stringent sufficient condition is :
Emax(Φ˜) ≤ n− s log2 n+ s log2 s2e
Proof. According to theorem 12, the protocol is λ-secure for
1
2
[
γ
(
− 1nEmax(Φ˜)
)
− 1n
]
≥ λ
γ
(
− 1nEmax(Φ˜)
)
≥ 1n + 2λ
= 1n − 2n log2 ε (lemma 9)
=: sn
applying g = γ−1 to both sides leads to
− 1nEmax(Φ˜) ≥ g
(
s
n
)
Emax(Φ˜) ≤ −ng
(
s
n
)
= n− s− nh( sn)
which gives the first inequality of the theorem.
A straightforward study of the binary entropy functions
shows that nh
(
s
n
) ≤ s log2 n− s log2 se . Substituting this ex-
pression in the above equation concludes the proof.
We have now all the elements to prove the security of a QPV
protocol. For the sake of simplicity, we limit ourselves to the
unidimensional case. In this case a QPV protocol involves two
verifiers {V1,V2} and a prover P between them. The QPVBB84
protocol [3] can be described as follows
1. V1 and V2 privately chose the strings Xn and Θn.
2. V1 sends to P the quantum state
⊗
i Hˆ
ϑi |xi〉.
43. V2 sends Θn to P.
4. P receives the messages of {V1,V2} simultaneously.
He measures the qubits in the base Θn and obtains
X˜n = Xn. He immediately broadcasts X˜n to
{V1,V2}.
5. {V1,V2} accept P’s position iff X˜n = Xn and if they
receive this information on time
The timing is such that P has to be at the right place to receive
both the qubits and Θn, and then broadcast the measurement
result to V1 and V2 on time. We refer the reader to [3] for a
precise definition of the timing and the correctness condition,
as we are mainly concerned by the cheating strategies.
We now study the security of this protocol against a coali-
tion of two malicious cheaters {M1,M2}, M1 (resp. M2)
being closer to V1 (resp. V2) than P is supposed to be.
The timing constraints allow them a single round of classical
communications. In the NEM they have access to no quan-
tum communications, except an initially shared bipartite state
Φ˜ ∈ S(M1,M2). Note that an access to a quantum informa-
tion channel of finite entanglement cost [20] can be brought
in this model trough the corresponding state Φ. The possible
action of the cheaters are:
1. M1 performs a generalized measurement on the qubits
sent by V1 and his half M1 of the state Φ. He gets a
classical quantum system C1Q1 and sends C1 to M2
2. Depending on Θn,M2 performs a generalized measure-
ment on his half M2 of the state Φ. He obtains a C2Q2
and sends C2 to M1
3. Receiving Ci±1, Mi extracts his best guess Xni from
C1C2Qi and sends it to Vi
This looks like an attack on WSE in the NEM, where
{Vi}i = {Ai}i and {Mi}i = {Bi}i, with the supplementary
requirement that M1 = B1 has also to output Xn. In particu-
lar, it means that any attack on QPVBB84 leads to an attack on
QPVBB84 in NEM, leading us to our main result :
Theorem 14. QPVBB84 is ε-secure if the state Φ shared by M1
and M2 verifies
Emax(Φ˜) ≤ n− s− nh
(
s
n
)
where s := 1− 2 log2 ε and e is the basis of the natural loga-
rithm. A slightly more stringent sufficient condition is :
Emax(Φ˜) ≤ n− s log2 n+ s log2 s2e
Proof. Corollary 13 ensures that WSE is ε-secure in the NEM
against adversaries using Φ as resource. We will now prove
by contradiction that QPVBB84 is also ε-secure.
Let us suppose it is not the case: M1 andM2 have a cheating
strategy winning in QPVBB84 with probability P
QPV
cheat > ε. They
can use this strategy as B1 and B2 in a WSE protocol, without
theM2 → M1 communication and the final broadcasts ofXni ,
and usingXn2 as guess forX
n. Their probability to cheat WSE
is P WSEcheat = P (X
n
2 = X
n) ≥ P QPVcheat > ε: WSE is not ε-secure,
which is contradictory with corollary 13.
Therefore, QPVBB84 is ε-secure.
We have shown the security of the practical protocol
QPVBB84 in one dimension against a coalition of cheaters shar-
ing an entangled state of max- relative entropy of entangle-
ment Emax(Φ) ≤ n − O(log n). This bound is the best
known to date for a QPV protocol and is essentially tight for
QPVBB84, since an attack using n−O(1) ebits is known [8, 13].
While this method probably generalizes to the multidimen-
sional case using tools from [12], as well as to other protocols,
like QPVMUBs [11] and non-Pauli variants of QPVBB84 [8, 13],
it will not approach the exponential upper bound of these pro-
tocols. This method is also useless when M1 and M2 have
access to an unlimited quantum channel (but did not use it for
some reason to share entanglement before the protocol starts),
while the bound of [14] works in this case.
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